Kenyan dairy policy change: influence pathways and economic impacts by Kaitibie, S. et al.
  1
Kenyan Dairy Policy Change: Influence Pathways and Economic Impacts1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIMEON KAITIBIE 
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, Aleppo, Syria 
 
AMOS OMORE, KARL RICH, BEATRICE SALASYA, NICHOLAS HOOTEN, DANIEL 
MWERO and PATTI KRISTJANSON 
International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1  This is a pre‐published version of the following article:  Kaitibie S, Omore A, Rich K, Salasya B, Hooten N, Mwero D, 
Kristjanson P. 2010. Kenyan dairy policy change: Influence pathways and economic impacts. World Development, Vol. 38, 
No. 10, pp. 1494–1505. 
 
  i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The authors wish to thank the CGIAR’s Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA) and 
ILRI for providing financial support to undertake this exercise. Development of appropriate 
methodology for assessing the impact of this policy-oriented research benefited extensively 
from two workshops that were organized by SPIA: one in Washington, D.C. in February 
2007 and the other in Los Banos, the Philippines in December 2007. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge the support from all participants at those workshops.  Earlier drafts of this work 
benefited immensely from constructive comments by SPIA members Jim Ryan and Tim 
Kelley, and SPIA consultants Bruce Gardner, Carol Weiss and Rob Paarlberg. In addition, 
Jeff Davis and Wade Brorsen provided significant commentary and input into the analytical 
framework. The authors also wish to thank Ade Freeman, Hezekiah Muriuki, Isabelle 
Baltenweck, Margaret Lukuyu, Philip Cherono and Steve Staal for providing invaluable 
insights into the Kenyan dairy policy change process, and Tezira Lore for editing.  
 
  2
ABSTRACT 
Marketing, transporting, processing, and consuming dairy products contribute significantly to 
the livelihoods of many poor Kenya households. This study analyses the impact of recent 
research supporting policy changes to liberalize informal milk markets. The study found that 
behavioural changes in dairy sector participants arising from the research evidence-supported 
policy and regulatory changes led to an average 9% reduction in milk marketing margins, and 
a significant increase in the number of licensed small-scale milk vendors. A $10 million 
research and outreach effort over 8 years resulted in estimated total benefits that continue to 
be realized of at least 2.17 billion ($X) each year, largely captured by consumers, producers, 
and milk vendors.  The net present value of this policy-oriented research investment was 
estimated to be US$ 230 million.     
 
Keywords - Policy-oriented research, impact assessment, dairy, equilibrium displacement, 
Africa, Kenya 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In Kenya, informal milk markets account for approximately 86% of milk supplies to 
consumers (Omore et al., 2004) and its supply-chain-related actors include small-scale 
producers, mobile milk traders, milk bar (tea shop) operators and milk transporters (informal 
sector small-scale milk vendors, or SSMV’s). This dominance of SSMVs in Kenya is also 
seen in neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, and in many other 
developing countries, including India, which is now the largest dairy producer in the world. 
The demand for milk and milk products is on the rise in Kenya, where annual per 
capita milk consumption is now estimated at 145 litres, more than five times higher than milk 
consumption in other East African countries. Dairy products constitute the largest food 
expenditure item in Kenyan households (Argwings-Kodhek et al., 2005; Salasya et al., 2006).   
 Although most milk in Kenya passes through informal market channels, previous 
government policies did not adequately address the concerns of the farmers, traders and 
consumers who make up these channels. The informal milk markets dominate because milk 
sold through informal markets reaches and satisfies the traditional tastes of poor consumers 
who pay a lower price for it and farmers receive higher prices than they do via the formal 
sector. The former colonial dairy policy, which essentially criminalized the activities of 
small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs), was largely designed to protect the interests of large-
scale settler dairy producers and professed to be based on concerns about food safety and 
quality. Prior to an important policy change in 2004, small-scale dairy producers and traders 
were often harassed as large, powerful dairy market players, linked to those in authority, 
sought to increase their relatively small market share. The activities of SSMVs were not 
recognized and they could not trade unless licensed, yet the existing regulations made no 
provisions for licensing or engaging them. The main regulatory body, the Kenya Dairy Board 
(KDB), perceived its mandate as one to stamp out small-scale marketing channels. 
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Regulations in effect only recognized a western industrial model of processing and packaging 
of milk, and small-scale milk producers were required to act only as suppliers. 
 Efforts to revise the old Kenya dairy policy were spearheaded by the Smallholder 
Dairy Project (SDP), a collaboratively implemented, integrated livestock research and 
development project whose broad objectives were twofold. The initial research phase focused 
on identifying best-bet technologies aimed at improving livestock farming practices and 
livelihoods. The second phase of SDP initiated and implemented strategies to influence and 
enhance changes in the Kenyan dairy policy, particularly those that did not officially 
recognize the existence or operations of SSMVs. The revised policy would allow KDB to 
engage SSMVs through training and licensing as well as milk promotion. SDP officially 
commenced in 1997 and ceased its activities by 2005.  
 This study is an ex post assessment of the impact of the revised Kenya dairy policy. It 
outlines the policy change process, investigates induced behavioural changes at the levels of 
field regulators and SSMVs, and estimates economic impacts on producers, SSMVs and 
consumers. It also provides a strategic assessment of the magnitude of returns to the research 
and coordination roles played by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), 
recognizing that ILRI was only one partner in a complex project with many people and 
organizations involved. The SDP was implemented by ILRI, the Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) and the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development 
(MoLFD) and funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). Ths SDP 
Manager was an employee of MoLFD.  Objectives of this ex post assessment include:  
• To describe and better understand the policy, institutional and behavioural changes that 
have occurred in Kenya’s dairy sector and to identify and learn lessons about how they 
occurred and what role the research and coordination component of SDP played. 
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• To measure the overall economic benefits of the policy change to consumers, producers 
and SSMVs. 
• To present a counterfactual situation, depicting what might have happened if SDP had not 
been implemented and the dairy policy had not changed. 
2.  METHODS 
The study assesses both the influence of the research on the policy change process and 
estimates the economic impact of the policy change. It describes the pathway from research 
to economic impacts on ultimate beneficiaries (see Figure 1). Lessons learned regarding 
influencing policy processes are described in detail in Leksmono et al. (2006) and 
summarized here. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 The approach analyzes what influenced changes in policy and behaviour, i.e. tracking 
back from the policy change to explore and document the influences of SDP in Kenya. The 
economic impact component models the impacts of the changes in policy on farm and retail 
prices, as well as on the economic welfare of farmers, SSMVs, consumers and input 
suppliers.  
(a)  Study area, data sources and sampling framework 
Field interviews were conducted in the Nairobi area and Nakuru in August 2007 with 
a sample of 61 milk traders (30 from Nairobi and 31 from Nakuru) and five field regulators 
(three from Nairobi and two from Nakuru). In addition, we interviewed several policymakers 
and SDP researchers, including KDB Technical Services Manager, an assistant to the KDB 
Technical Services Manager, Chief Executive of SITE Enterprise Promotion, a former SDP 
Manager and two researchers from ILRI. The field interviews were conducted by an ILRI 
researcher and consultant experienced in dairy sector regulation and familiar with SDP. The 
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interviews with milk traders and field regulators were conducted between August 1 and 
August 10, 2007. The interviews with policymakers and SDP researchers were conducted in 
June and July 2007 and additional information solicited in January 2008. 
 The interviews focused on the policy change process as reported by policy officials 
and associated behavioural changes among field regulators and milk traders. Because this ex 
post impact assessment had limited time and funds available, the study was limited to Nairobi 
and Nakuru but included Kiambu and Thika towns on the outskirts of Nairobi. The study 
areas have always had KDB offices and operations. Aside from the police who were tasked 
under the Dairy Industry Act to act as field-level regulators, most recognized market 
locations where SSMVs operate have at least one field regulator from the Public Health 
Department and one from KDB. In addition, KDB is now spearheading training and licensing 
efforts in these areas, so that the impact of the new policy is more easily identified in these 
areas than elsewhere. 
Nairobi is a high milk density area where the dairy sector is dominated by small-scale 
milk producers. The area has a large collection of different trader groups with some, 
particularly transporters and mobile traders, coming from as far as 100 km away. The Thika 
area supplies parts of Nairobi and Machakos and is dominated by milk bars and small-scale 
mobile traders. These traders supply a competitive, urban and relatively sophisticated market. 
Milk is collected in the morning before 0600 hours and transported by public vehicles, 
arriving at the market by 0900 hours. Some of the traders act as middlemen, selling their milk 
to other traders who then transport their consignment to the market.  Nakuru, on the other 
hand, is surrounded by large-scale farmers who deliver their milk directly to processors. 
Small-scale milk traders are left to collect milk from as far as 40 km away from town. The 
area is dominated by small-scale mobile traders and milk bars. Small-scale mobile traders 
transport milk using bicycles.    
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Purposeful sampling of SSMVs was undertaken in order to collect information from 
as many traders as possible given constraints of time and funds. Similarly, the choice of 
interviewees was not statistically random. Using a checklist, SSMVs from Nairobi and 
Nakuru were individually engaged in interviews and informal discussions. No prior 
appointments were made with the traders; they were interviewed as they were encountered 
going about routine milk marketing operations.  
3.  UNDERSTANDING POLICY PROCESSES AND RESEARCH INFLUENCE  
The Smallholder Dairy Project, funded by DFID, started in August 1997 as an 
integrated, collaborative research and development initiative whose purpose was to support 
the sustainable development of the smallholder dairy sub-sector in Kenya.  
(a)  Research and advocacy activities in SDP 
From 1997–2000 SDP carried out a rapid appraisal of dairy production systems and 
an economic and structural analysis of dairying, while addressing policy and institutional 
issues. One of the major findings was that the informal milk sector was critical to the 
livelihoods of milk producers, traders and consumers. Structured household surveys were 
used in Kiambu District (close to Nairobi) and other districts in Kenya’s Central Province. 
SDP also assessed public health hazards in the informal milk marketing sector, characterized 
diary systems and technology uptake, and examined policies and laws banning milk sales by 
SSMVs in urban areas of Kenya 
The second phase of SDP (2000–2005) focused on policy-level outputs and more 
active engagement with policymakers. Following a ‘snapshot review’ in 2000 which reported 
favourably on SDP’s progress but noted that uptake of technologies at farm level was 
difficult in the prevailing policy environment, it was recommended that SDP develop a 
strategy for the reform of dairy policy using evidence-based SDP research findings in order to 
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increase impact. SDP drew up a strategy for influencing policy, focusing in particular on the 
findings concerning the informal milk market, its importance for livelihoods and ways in 
which perceived public health risks could be addressed. The Kenyan dairy policy at that time 
did not directly prohibit the uptake of any smallholder farm-level technologies. However, it 
made farm-level production increases and quality improvement less palatable options because 
the policy prohibited milk sales through the informal sector into urban areas. It was clear that 
the prevailing policy environment was actively discouraging the predominant section of the 
market, with major implications for producers, traders and consumers whose livelihoods 
depended on this informal sector. To tackle some of the identified informal market issues, 
SDP piloted the training of SSMVs in basic milk testing, hygiene and handling. 
 Part of SDP’s policy-influencing strategy was to foster links with civil society 
organizations (CSOs) that could bring capacity to engage in policy advocacy in a way that the 
SDP implementing institutions could not. These CSOs became engaged in active advocacy in 
support of small-scale traders and farmers and, together with the KDB, were partners in 
SDP’s high-level dairy policy forum held in 2004 to present the project’s research results and 
highlight their policy implications. 
 DFID funded SDP to the tune of approximately USD 2.5 million from 1997 to 2005. 
Consultations with former SDP personnel revealed that the project’s research and 
development partners contributed an additional USD 2.5 million in staff time, staff resources 
and other in-kind contributions over the life of the project. Actual staff time in hours was 
difficult to quantify but SDP had a project manager appointed by MoLFD, ILRI provided the 
technical research team and the CSOs were very active in the advocacy phase. A steering 
committee was established with members from ILRI, KARI, KDB, KEBS, MoLFD and the 
Ministry of Health and some informal market actors. 
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(b)  Policy influence pathways in SDP and the evolution of Kenya dairy policy 
Research aimed at influencing policy is challenging and research into what it takes to 
successfully influence policy is in its infancy.  This ex ante economic analysis significantly 
benefited from two years of parallel research into better understanding the underlying 
processes of dairy policy change and the role played by the smallholder dairy project in 
influencing policy change that positively impacted many poor people (see Leksmono et al., 
2006). Kenyan dairy policy history and processes are captured in detail in Leksmono et al., 
(2006).  Here we focus on the most relevant changes and key lessons learned regarding how 
research influenced policy processes in this instance. Table 1 presents a summary of 
important events and activities and their timing in the overall dairy policy change process in 
Kenya. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
By 2003, the policy advocacy phase of the SDP had become very active. The new 
government made some changes to the KDB, but by then, such vacillations had emboldened 
large-scale processors who were opposed to the new bill and policy. In addition to safety and 
quality issues addressed in the research phase, SDP arguments in favour of engaging SSMVs 
included the huge impact on employment creation and poverty reduction in the era of 
Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP). Paid advertisements were placed in 
local newspapers touting the benefits of legalization, but these were met with rebuttals in the 
same media by large-scale processors, culminating, by late 2003, in what became known as 
the ‘milk wars’. Arguments in favour of legalization which appeared in local media used 
research evidence from SDP. In May 2004, SDP and partners organized a consultative dairy 
policy forum of stakeholders including ministers, members of parliament and other 
government officials, at which it was agreed in principle that the policy of engagement with 
SSMVs would be supported. Presentations at the forum included research findings that 
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supported pro-poor policy reforms. In addition, SDP and partners officially launched policy 
briefs and screened a video entitled ‘Unheard voices from Kenya’s dairy industry’. 
 While the bill and policy change processes continued in parliament, ministerial 
authority allowed the Minster for Livestock and Fisheries Development, on the advice of the 
KDB, to issue a set of dairy industry regulations (Legal Notices 101, 102 and 103) in 
September 2004. While they were all updated versions of sub-sections of the revised 1958 
Act, the most pertinent one was Legal Notice 102, also known as the Dairy Industry (Sales by 
Producers) Regulations, 2004. These regulations streamlined the licence application 
processes and, more importantly, clearly enumerated the types of licences that were now 
available in the dairy sector (e.g. primary producer, processor, mini dairy, cottage industry, 
milk bar and cooling plant), some of which were clearly focused on activities that were 
compatible with small-scale informal operations. KDB officials used the impetus provided by 
the issuance of these regulations to engage and institute training, certification and licensing 
requirements for SSMVs. 
 Since the policy change, KDB has worked to train and certify SSMVs while licensing 
their milk outlets and premises which meet requirements on handling, hygiene and quality 
control. In addition, KDB has trained and employed the services of business development 
service (BDS) providers to train and certify SSMVs whose businesses would then be licensed 
by KDB. While progress is being made on these fronts, the number of BDS providers is still 
small relative to the number of SSMVs waiting to be trained, certified and licensed. Also, 
KDB is working with NGOs like SITE Enterprise Promotion to encourage milk consumption 
on the premise that quality is being greatly improved by training and licensing. KDB has 
started branding milk outlets and premises to improve consumer confidence and promote 
recognition by regulatory authorities. Evidence, though yet anecdotal, suggests that milk sales 
are increasing in these branded outlets and premises. 
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4.  IMPACT OF NEW DAIRY POLICY ON ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE  
Primary information to assess the impact of the new dairy policy on enforcement and 
compliance and changes in general attitudes and behaviour of both regulators and SSMVs 
was obtained from interviews with field regulators and SSMVs. Survey references to periods 
before and after the policy changes, respectively referred to the days or weeks prior to 
September 2004 versus July/August 2007. Additional insights were gleaned from interviews 
with policymakers and researchers.  
(a)  Behavioural change among field regulators 
Around late 2004, field regulators instituted some changes in enforcement activities, 
following specific instructions from KDB and Public Health Department officials. Previous 
activities were limited to policing and inspection, usually checking for licences that were 
never issued. Currently, their task is to ensure that licensed outlets and premises operated by 
SSMVs meet conditions on milk hygiene and testing requirements, sanitation of premises and 
health status of SSMVs. They also provide advice on how to meet these conditions. In 
addition, some regulators issue milk movement permits to mobile traders and assist the 
licensing process by enabling relevant paperwork required from SSMVs; these activities are 
accomplished through field visits, spot checks and training. The skills required to bring about 
these changes have mostly been obtained through formal training over the last few years. 
(b)  Behavioural change among SSMVs 
To assess behavioural change among SSMVs, a survey was conducted of 61 milk 
traders along the purposefully selected Central and Western milk market chain areas. The 
areas of Nairobi (including Nairobi, Thika and Kiambu) and Nakuru were selected because 
they represent scheduled trading areas with KDB offices and would therefore be directly 
influenced by the regulations. 
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 Survey results showed that all the interviewed milk traders owned their operations, 
although there were milk bar operations established by groups of SSMVs. Most (82%) of the 
businesses were started in 2004 or earlier, i.e. before the policy change, so most interviewed 
traders were familiar with the policy enforcement environment before and after the policy 
change. 
 Almost 50% of SSMVs interviewed were producer-traders, implying that their milk 
was sourced from their farms. The remainder were almost evenly divided among traders who 
were non-producers, transporter-traders and milk bar operators, with almost all their milk 
coming from other milk traders. Table 2 presents the distribution of SSMVs interviewed. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Almost all respondents were familiar with the new regulations or requirements on 
milk handling and quality control, and they used these guidelines or regulations in the 
conduct of their businesses. The specific regulatory requirements mentioned include training 
and licensing, types of containers used and hygiene. Many SSMVs received information on 
milk handling and quality control from KDB and, to a lesser extent, from ILRI and other 
SSMVs, mostly between 2005 and 2007. This was the period when KDB actively encouraged 
SSMVs to obtain training and to familiarize themselves with issues related to milk handling 
and quality control. 
 The surveys were conducted in areas where KDB operates. In the survey, 
approximately 85% of respondents reported that they had been trained on milk handling and 
quality control methods. However, only half of them reported applying and receiving 
operating licences immediately following training, implying a lag between training and 
licensing. The hiatus is not unusual, given that training and certification of SSMVs by BDS 
and KDB usually precede licensing of premises and outlets for milk sales. In reality, all but 
two SSMVs who were interviewed had one form of licence or another for their operations. 
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The most common licences reported were milk bar licences (49%), milk movement permits 
(44%) and mini-dairy licences (15%), as presented in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Consistent with the policy change timeline, most SSMVs were trained by KDB agents 
between 2005 and 2007. Nearly 90% of respondents reported that it was presently easier to 
obtain a license than in the period prior to 2004 when the new policy came into effect, noting 
that licensing is now being expedited following training and other requirements. 
 On average, SSMVs reported that before they were trained and licensed, they were 
harassed by KDB and other regulators about four times a month; the average frequency of 
harassment was significantly higher in Nakuru (six times a month) than in Nairobi. Forty 
percent of respondents reported that they were last harassed by KDB or other regulators in 
2005 or later. The most common form of harassment was by confiscation of milk, but nearly 
10% of SSMVs reported bribing their way out of a potential arrest situation. Nearly all 
licensed SSMVs who had been in operation before the policy change reported a change in the 
behaviour of regulators toward them since licensing, noting that they were now allowed to 
operate as long as they complied significantly with all requirements. However, those whose 
premises and outlets were still not licensed were usually harassed by regulators, although to a 
lesser extent than before the policy change. 
5.  MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE NEW KENYAN DAIRY POLICY  
The policy changes were expected to improve the welfare of producers, traders and 
consumers by reducing transaction costs and the retail milk price while increasing producer 
prices. Previously, small-scale operators venturing into the retail market were likely to incur 
high transaction costs resulting from milk loss due to adverse police action, quality loss due 
to milk becoming sour and direct confiscation of milk and containers. However, those 
SSMVs who paid political rent avoided adverse police action as well as losses due to 
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confiscation of milk and milk containers. Both options ultimately translated into higher 
consumer prices. 
(a)  Policy impact on transaction costs: a model of equilibrium displacement 
Transaction costs include information, negotiation and enforcement costs (Hobbs 
1997). Several studies have shown that market participation by resource-poor smallholders is 
hindered by high transaction costs (Staal et al. 1997; Holloway et al. 2000). Implementation 
of the revised Kenya dairy policy reduced transaction costs and hence, marketing margins. 
Salasya et al. (2006) estimated the reduction in marketing margin at the SSMV level, using 
the transaction cost approach, at 38%, while this study measured transaction cost as the 
difference between farm price and retail price.  The distribution of gains arising from reduced 
transaction costs was investigated. The economic model evaluated the collective impact of 
the new policy through its effect on prices, quantities and overall welfare. 
 Several studies have used equilibrium displacement models to evaluate the 
distribution of gains from policy change (e.g. Freebairn et al. 1982; Wohlgenant 1993; Lusk 
and Anderson 2004). Consistent with these studies, we proposed a model to estimate 
distributional changes in farm and retail prices, and changes in welfare. To better explain our 
model of equilibrium displacement following Freebairn et al. (1982), we extended Gardner’s 
(1988) program effects model, to include the impact of a reduction in the cost of marketing 
goods and services in the Kenya dairy market (see Figure 2). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 The model assumes that the market is competitive, with linear demand and supply 
functions, and the supply of marketing goods and services is less than perfectly elastic, 
resulting in a normal supply curve for these goods and services. The model is appropriate 
because most of the milk produced in the informal sector is sold raw and it is unlikely that 
aggregate economy-wide pre-policy change milk losses were highly significant given the 
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following: (1) there was high consumer demand for raw, unpasteurized milk, while 
processors who served the retail markets sold only processed milk; (2) SSMVs had the legal 
option of selling their milk to large licensed processors who pay less than consumers; (3) 
SSMVs could make political rent payments to avoid confiscation of milk and containers; (4) 
SSMVs could target retail markets in areas where there was little or no regulatory activity 
and (5) SSMVs could engage in limited production for retail market. Some of these options 
may also reduce losses in quality. 
 In Figure 2, we illustrate the impact of change in the Kenya dairy policy on welfare 
gains by consumers, producers and SSMVs who provide marketing goods and services. We 
posit a two-market scenario, a ‘retail’ market with demand for milk Dr and supply of 
marketing goods and services Sn, and a ‘farm-level’ market with derived demand for milk Df 
and supply of milk Sf. Note that derived demand Df is equivalent to Dr - Sn ∀Quantity where 
Dr - Sn > 0. 
 We define market margin, M, as the difference between Df and Dr (i.e. M = Dr - Df); 
we assume that it is not constant but generally comprises a fixed portion and a portion that 
varies with quantity. In the pre-policy change environment, Pr is the price of milk in the retail 
market, Pn is the cost of supplying marketing goods and services in the retail market, Pf is the 
farm price for milk and Q0 is the initial milk quantity that clears the market. 
 To demonstrate the impact of the policy change, consider that the new policy of 
legalizing the activities of SSMVs after training and licensing leads to a reduction in 
transaction costs or market margin arising from significantly lower political rent payments 
and milk losses. Consequently, there is a reduction in the cost of supplying milk and milk 
products to the retail market. This results in a downward shift in the supply curve for 
marketing goods and services and, consequently, a new derived demand curve. The 
proportional shift in derived demand reflects a reduction in the market margin, M, by a cost, 
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w, which is measured as the vertical difference between the Df and Df’. The resulting increase 
in quantity of milk supplied to the market, from Q0 to Q1, is also occasioned by an increase in 
the number of SSMVs now supplying the retail market. The markets also see decreases in 
retail milk price and the cost of supplying marketing goods and services, but also an increase 
in milk prices received by farmers. As a result, Figure 2 shows unequivocal increases in 
consumer surplus by the area Pr mnr and producer surplus by the area Pf bcd whereas surplus 
accruing to SSMVs who supply milk and milk products to the market increases by the area 
efkl while losing the smaller Pngfh. These indicate that there are cost reduction benefits 
accruing to the market chain actors. In the case of SSMVs, reductions in margins accruing 
result from political rent that is no longer paid to regulators, and milk and milk containers 
that are no longer confiscated. The formulae for estimating the welfare changes are provided 
by Freebairn et al. (1982) and Wohlgenant (1993). 
 Based on these, we present an analytical model following Freebairn et al. (1982), 
adjusted to reflect that cost reductions only occur for SSMVs activities, but not for producers 
and input suppliers.  The competitive model of the post-policy change environment is 
presented as: 
(1)   rPQ 10 αα −= , 
(2)   QwM 10 ββ +−= , 
(3)   MPP fr += , 
(4)   ( )if PPQ −+= 10 φφ  and 
(5)   ,10 QP
i δδ +=  
where Q is the quantity of milk at the farm level (which clears the market at equilibrium), Pr 
is milk price in the retail market, Pf is milk price at the farm level, M is the retail farm price 
margin and Pi is the cost of non-farm input per unit farm output. In the model, cost reductions 
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attributed to the new policy are represented as w to the SSMV.  In all cases, the overall effect 
is an increase in milk quantity. From the model above, equation (1) is the retail demand 
schedule, equation (2) is the SSMV schedule or market margin equation, equation (3) is the 
price link equation representing the retail farm price margin, equation (4) is the farm supply 
schedule and equation (5) is the input supply schedule. As previously mentioned, the market 
margin is not constant. Rather, it includes a fixed component and a component that varies 
with quantity. Algebraic solutions to the system of equations above (see Freebairn et al. 
(1982) for an intuitive insight into the derivations) are provided to estimate changes in 
surpluses to consumers, marketers, farmers and input suppliers, respectively, as:  
(6)    HWCS /1φ=Δ  
(7)   HWSSMVS /111 φαβ=Δ  
(8)    HWPS /1α=Δ , and  
(9)    HWISS /111 φαδ=Δ , 
where HhQhW 2/211φα+=  is aggregate welfare change, wh =  is aggregate cost reduced 
by the policy change and the term ( ) ( ) 111111 11 αδφφβα +++=H . The aggregate welfare 
change measures additional benefits that accrue to the economy as a result of the policy 
change. The parallel supply shift presented in Figure 2 represents a simplification; in reality, 
shifts in supply could also be convergent or divergent. The circumstances under which supply 
shifts can be divergent or convergent and methods for estimating the resulting benefits are 
well explained by Lindner and Jarrett (1978).  Figure 2 postulates that reduced transaction 
costs deriving from legalized trading after training and licensing would lead to an increase in 
farm price and a decrease in retail price, thus resulting in reduced market margins.  
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(b)  Policy impact and changes in market margin 
The average SSMV conducts several transactions in the milk sales business. Those 
transactions that may not have changed with the new policy include transportation, cess, 
market place tax and the number of containers used. Those that may have changed with the 
new policy include the type of containers used, payment of illegal contingency fees or 
political rent, milk and container loss due to confiscation, milk preservation and quality 
control, and training and licensing. This study measured transactions costs in terms of retail-
farm price margins. Results for daily milk prices are summarized by location and trader type 
in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Prices paid and received were highest at milk bars both before and after the policy 
change. As previously mentioned, the study used September 2004 as the policy change date 
and asked SSMVs to recall transactions in the immediate pre-policy change days and then 
compare those to similar transactions in August 2007. 
 In Nairobi, the highest margins accrued to non-producer mobile traders both before 
and after the policy change, whereas in Nakuru the highest margins accrued to producer 
mobile traders. When averaged over SSMVs in Nairobi, there was a KES 0.80 per litre 
(roughly $X) decline in margin that may be attributed to the new policy’s effect of reducing 
market margins. On the other hand, in Nakuru, the decline in margin attributed to the impact 
of the new policy was only KES 0.27 per litre ($X), indicating that the new policy appeared 
to have a less discernible effect on the prices of unprocessed milk in Nakuru. In Nairobi, 
gains in margins resulting from the new policy were highest among non-producer mobile 
traders, followed by milk bars and mobile transporters. 
 The study used tests of statistical significance to determine whether margins 
significantly declined following the implementation of the new policy. A t-test confirmed that 
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for the combined data (i.e. Nairobi and Nakuru) comparing margins before and after policy 
change, there was no statistically significant difference (t = 1.16; p = 0.1256). However, 
when Mann Whitney tests were performed for the Nairobi dataset alone, the average margin 
of KES 6.13/litre before policy change was found to be statistically higher than the average 
post-policy change margin of KES 5.33/litre, albeit only at 10% probability level (Z = 1.36; p 
= 0.087). Tests for Nakuru revealed that post-policy change margins were not statistically 
different from pre-policy change margins. Consequently, the study estimated separate welfare 
measurements for Nairobi area alone, and for the Kenyan economy.   
 Information obtained from the above analysis of market margins in the Kenyan milk 
sector showed that policy-change effects on margin were more evident in Nairobi than 
elsewhere in the country. Policy-change institutions such as KDB and BDS providers are 
more visible, active and effective in Nairobi and its environs. Averaged over all locations and 
SSMVs, the study found a KES 0.54 per litre ($X) reduction in margin, equivalent to 
approximately 9% of the pre-policy change margin. Although the overall reduction in margin 
(averaged over locations and SSMVs) appears small, Figure 3 shows more than a fourfold 
increase in quantities purchased and sold in Nairobi in the period after the policy change and 
more than a threefold increase over all locations. Evidently, SSMVs make their profits from 
small margins but high volume, quick turnovers. While the decline in market margin may 
also have been affected over time by other factors such as fuel costs, the simplified frame-
work applied here assumes that such cost changes are minimal and hence attributes all margin 
reductions to the policy change. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 The increase in quantities purchased and sold by SSMVs is not unusual, given that 
SSMV activities in scheduled urban areas like Nairobi were previously proscribed and 
therefore conducted under unfavourable conditions. Allowing licensed SSMVs to operate 
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freely in an environment with high demand for raw milk (e.g. annual per capita milk 
consumption was 145 litres in 2005) leads to increased milk supply to the retail market. In 
addition, approximately 45% of the SSMVs interviewed were licensed milk bar owners and 
daily throughput at milk bars serving an urban retail market could be much higher than, say, 
mobile bicycle traders. Still, the increased figures mentioned do not necessarily reflect 
evidence of higher market share to SSMVs; rather they reflect the ability to now conduct 
marketing activities freely, aided by increasing demand. While annual statistics for milk 
intake into the formal sector are readily available, those for the informal sector are not, hence 
the use of recall information.  
(c)  Welfare changes attributed to policy change 
We used the economic model outlined in Section 5.1 to estimate changes in surpluses 
that accrue to consumers, farmers, SSMVs and input suppliers, and then compared the 
aggregate of these changes to project costs in order to also estimate the profitability of a POR 
project: the SDP. In its optimal form, the model is expressed in terms of parameters of retail 
demand, farm supply and marketer schedules, together with cost changes resulting from 
policy change. In the absence of survey data typically used to estimate these schedules, we 
used values presented in Table 5 (and sources) to estimate the parameters for the economy-
wide model. Table 6 presents the parameters used to calculate the Nairobi area welfare 
changes. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  
 The data sources included a combination of SDP statistics, survey data and grey 
literature. We used SDP data for raw milk production in Kenya, updated in 2005 (SDP 2005). 
Farm and retail prices were obtained from the surveys. Following Salasya et al. (2006), we 
used housing as a non-farm input and expressed the cost of housing obtained from that study 
(KES 1313 per month) per unit of raw milk produced per year. We also obtained own price 
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elasticities of demand and supply from the same study. We found no comparable previous 
studies measuring elasticities of marketing services and marketing inputs, but Freebairn et al. 
(1982) mention evidence of highly elastic long-run supply curves, thus using a value of 2 or 
∞ for illustrative purposes. To use these elasticity measures, the usual caveat of assuming 
homogeneous preferences among consumers, farmers, SSMVs and input suppliers applies. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 Estimates of cost reductions in the market margin due to the policy change include 
KES 0.54 per ($X) litre, or X% of the retail? price to the milk vendor.  The Nairobi area 
model used the same information on elasticities of milk demand, farm-level milk supply and 
supply of marketing services as did the country-wide analysis. In the models under 
consideration, aggregate gains are known to be proportional to cost reductions but elasticities 
have minimal effects, except in terms of distributions. Simulation results are presented in 
Table 7 for the economy-wide scenario and for the Nairobi scenario.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Table 7 presents estimates of how much the dairy sector is contributing to the Kenyan 
economy, when the effect of the policy change is to reduce transaction costs at the SSMV 
level alone.  Total benefits accruing to the sector are estimated at KES 2.17 billion per 
annum. More than 70% of the benefits accrue to producers and consumers, and less than 30% 
to SSMVs and input suppliers. As earlier observed, SSMVs and input suppliers operate in a 
small margin environment, and this could account for their smaller share of total benefits. 
Gains realized by SSMVs and input suppliers come from higher sales alone. 
 Nairobi area welfare gains account for approximately 18% of the economy-wide 
gains.  With a potential consumer base of nearly 3.4 million (or 10% of Kenya’s total 
population), Nairobi area welfare gains are sufficiently high to justify the efforts to date on 
training and licensing and suggest the level of potential benefits to further investment in these 
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activities. However, when the total costs of training and licensing (country-wide costs) are 
accounted for, policy change in Nairobi area alone is not cost-effective. 
 The NPV of the stream of net benefits was calculated for the economy-wide model 
(Table 8) using the following assumptions: First, research costs (USD 5 million) were equally 
spread over the first eight years, corresponding to the life of the project and ending in the year 
2004 when the policy change was effected. Second, total DFID funding for SDP was USD 
2.5 million over an eight-year period, plus an estimated USD 2.5 million from in-kind 
contribution by SDP partners. Third, benefits were assumed to start accruing in year 2005 
and, for the purpose of this analysis, to the year 2039. Fourth, in the year when benefits start 
accruing, we impute additional costs of training and licensing of SSMVs (as estimated above) 
amounting to KES 864 million per year as follows (see ILRI, undated, for cost estimates): 
because the system was designed to be sustainable, costs of training and certification would 
be borne by SSMVs. Fifth, based on discussions with KDB officials, we estimated that 50 
BDS providers (the target figure for KDB) would train approximately 160 SSMVs per week. 
SSMVs pay KES 1000 for training (KES 8.3 million per year). Trained SSMVs pay a one-
time licence fee of KES 3500 (KES 29.12 million per year). Sixth, SSMVs pay cess fees to 
KDB at KES 0.20 per litre (KES 803.17 million per year). The cess fee is a tax collected by 
the KDB, which should technically be collected at the farm level. However, because small-
scale producers are not easily tracked (unlike large producers), KDB officials have routinely 
opted to collect cess fees at bulking and collection points, where SSMVs operate. This adds a 
tax burden to SSMVs. Seventh, SSMVs pay statutory costs that include municipal/council 
fees, commerce fees and health inspection fees, amounting to KES 2811 (KES 23.39 million 
per year). And finally, we assumed interest rates of 1.99% (real interest rate in Kenya; base 
year 2007), while 5% and 15%, were used to account for inherent risks in some projects.  
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
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The results of the analysis (Table 8) show that under the economy-wide scenario, the 
SDP research investment costs are easily recouped, as the NPV is greater than zero, even 
when the interest rate is 15%. When the cost of capital exceeds the internal rate of return 
(IRR), the investment becomes unprofitable. For the economy-wide scenario, the cost of 
capital would have to exceed 55% before the costs outweighed the benefits of the investment. 
For the Nairobi area scenario, overall costs exceed benefits, implying that the investment in 
the policy research has a negative return if the benefits are assumed to only occur in Nairobi. 
 We also re-estimated welfare benefits of the dairy policy research using an estimate of 
a 38% margin reduction, derived from Salasya et al. (2006). Based on our data, this amounts 
to KES 2.38 per litre. As previously explained, the model is highly sensitive to changes in 
cost reductions. With a decrease in the marketing margin for SSMVs of KES 2.38 per litre, 
annual total benefits increased to KES 9.64 billion, compared to benefits of KES 2.17 billion 
when margins were assumed to decline by KES 0.54 per litre.    . 
(d)  Creating a counterfactual and attributing policy impact 
The benefits from the change in policy in this case study began to be realized in the ninth 
year following the launch of SDP (Table 8). Policymakers and researchers were interviewed 
to ascertain their perceptions as to how long it would have taken for the policy change to 
occur, and how long it would have taken for SSMVs to be engaged by regulatory bodies, 
without the research and interventions of the Smallholder Dairy Project.  These interviews 
revealed that the key drivers within the KDB policy change process were: (1) release of 
credible research information by the MoLFD/KARI/ILRI Smallholder Dairy Project; (2) 
restructuring of KDB operations funded by FAO that involved staff rationalization, 
recruitment of qualified staff and capacity building; (3) engagement in collaborative projects 
aimed at improving small-scale milk marketing, mainly focussing on testing a quality 
assurance approach involving training (based on standardized training requirements) and 
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certification of small-scale milk traders; (4) development of the first strategic plan with clear 
goals and activities; (5) the creation of dairy regulatory forums with representatives of key 
stakeholders at all levels; (6) review of regulations within the current dairy policy framework; 
and (7) engagement in the process of harmonization of regional dairy policies, regulations, 
training and quality assurance standards. 
SDP played a pivotal role in effecting policy change, accelerating a process and 
outcome that without the project may have come many years later. Of course, SDP research 
and policy advocacy were collaboratively carried out by several institutions, including ILRI, 
KARI and MoLFD. Attributing the benefits of policy change in a multi-institution effort is 
not a marginal exercise. First, the policy change is technically still in process, both with 
regards to final parliamentary passage of the main regulation and implementation of current 
training and licensing activities as envisioned in the policy. Consequently, the problem of 
attribution is compounded by an outcome that is yet unclear and not easily measurable 
quantitatively. The CGIAR Science Council commissioned a scoping study which articulated 
this problem (CGIAR Science Council 2006). Second, the policymaker MoLFD was one of 
the major institutions involved in the process, playing a key role in advocating for policy 
change, again making attribution difficult. 
 However, in order to quantify the probable economic impacts without SDP, 
information from key informants led to a study assumption that the Kenya policy review and 
legalization of SSMVs would have been delayed by 20 years, without SDP; impacts were re-
estimated, assuming a 10-year delay. A simplified additional assumption is that there are no 
additional investments or benefits until the year in which legalization would occur (i.e. 2015 
or 2025). The differences in NPV, with and without SDP, are presented in Table 9. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
  25
NPV continues to be positive even as legalization is postponed beyond 2004 when 
SDP influenced policy change (Table 9). In addition, the directly attributable impacts of SDP 
are also positive, as measured by the differences in outcomes with and without the project, 
suggesting that legalization resulting from SDP advocacy was beneficial. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
The research and coordination efforts of SDP continue to contribute to the policy 
implementation phase, producing policy briefs, training manuals and sessions on milk 
handling and quality control. These research efforts have also contributed empirical evidence 
supporting the harmonization of dairy policy regulations across East Africa. Lessons learned 
in terms of ILRI’s success in getting empirical evidence to inform dairy policy changes are 
highlighted in a study by Leksmono et al. (2006) on the role of research in pro-poor dairy 
policy shift in Kenya. They include: (1) good collaboration between the SDP institutions was 
a key contributor to the success of SDP in achieving policy change; (2) SDP research was 
rigorous and by the time the advocacy phase came along, SDP had obtained a set of highly 
technical and pertinent research results; (3) SDP was particularly effective in achieving 
policy change because it started as a research and development project and (4) farmers and 
SSMVs were empowered by SDP to speak out on issues affecting the sector, and this was a 
most compelling factor in changing opinions of decision makers at the May 2004 policy 
forum.  
Currently, the Kenyan dairy sector is liberalized and moving ahead with plans to train 
and license SSMVs to become fully engaged in the formal sector. The revision of the Kenyan 
dairy policy to reflect engagement with SSMVs in the formal sector is still in parliamentary 
process. However, significant progress has been made and Kenya now leads a noteworthy 
regional effort to harmonize dairy policies and liberalize trade in dairy products among 
countries in East Africa. In neighbouring countries like Tanzania and Uganda where there 
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have been no SDP-like activity, policy change has been carried out at a slower rate than in 
Kenya, hence the process of policy harmonization in the region is helping to speed it up. 
We found that the smallholder dairy project efforts produced a significant volume of 
evidence used to influence the policy change process at various stages by different decision-
makers and organizations. Although the Kenyan dairy policy document and bill have been in 
parliamentary process for more than a decade, written ministerial subsidiary regulation and 
KDB reorganization provide ample regulatory authority for engaging SSMVs, and this 
significant shift in dairy regulation was traced back to September 2004. The study found 
significant evidence of behavioural change among regulators and SSMVs that has led to 
positive economic benefits across Kenya. 
The impact of the new policy on market margins shows a significant lowering of 
margins in Nairobi, by KES 0.80 per litre.  In the post policy change environment, increased 
market quantities were observed in both locations, with approximately fourfold increases in 
Nairobi. Small-scale dairy operators have profited from quick, relatively high volume 
turnovers, and as a result, welfare benefits accruing to SSMVs increased; these benefits were 
also captured by consumers and producers. A cost-benefit analysis revealed that the policy 
change was highly profitable.  In addition, the very high IRR value suggests that positive net 
benefits will continue to be gained by many actors in the dairy sector for years to come. 
However, the Kenyan government will need to devise a fairer way of distributing the cost of 
cess among consumers, producers, and SSMVs, rather than leveling a significant portion of 
this tax on the small-scale market vendors. 
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Figure 1.  Pathway of research outputs to impacts 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of returns from implementing the new Kenyan dairy policy 
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Source: Authors’ survey data (2007) 
 
Figure 3  Average daily quantities of milk purchased and sold by SSMVs before and after the 
policy change 
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Table 1.  Events and dates in Kenya’s dairy policy change process 
Year  Dairy policy event 
1992 The government committed to restructuring and strengthening of KCC and KDB. 
 
1993 A KDB workshop ‘Promoting Kenya dairy industry to the year 2000 and beyond’ was held in Naivasha in June. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and Marketing (MALDM) published the Dairy Development 
Policy document. 
 
1994 The government agreed that the Board of Directors for KDB be put in place and the Dairy Industry Act (CAP 336) 
be amended to reflect the liberalization of the dairy industry. 
 
1995 MALDM put in motion the process to revise the Dairy Industry Act. Agricultural sector review carried out, 
emphasizing the need to revise the Act and address KCC as part of the interventions required for privatization. 
Stakeholder workshop held in Naivasha in May, charged to revise the Act and draft a bill; a draft Dairy Industry 
bill was produced in the process. MALDM, donors, processors (from KCC), Kenya National Farmers Union, 
cooperatives etc. attended the workshop. 
 
A mission to restructure and reform KDB, sponsored by the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), proposed that KDB be reconstituted along the lines of the traditional, democratic annual general 
meeting. The government accepted a report emphasizing autonomy of KDB. DANIDA also agreed to fund the 
completion of the revision of the Act. 
 
1996 National stakeholders workshop convened in Embu in February to revise CAP 336, focusing on organization and 
structure of the new KDB; functions, powers and duties of the new KDB; management and administration of the 
new KDB; financial aspects of the new KDB; next steps (way forward) and the transition until KDB is fully 
autonomous and wholly funded by stakeholders through cess etc.  
 
KDB Board of Directors gazetted for the first time since 1972. Task force formed in April to consolidate the views 
arising from the stakeholders and other review processes. 
 
Assisted by consultant Prof. Mutungi, the task force held another national stakeholder workshop on the draft Dairy 
Industry Bill (1996) – or revised CAP 336 – in Naivasha in June to provide stakeholders with an opportunity to 
comment on and make suggestions to improve the draft Bill. A sub-committee of the task force was formed to 
review and revise the national dairy policy. MALDM referred the draft Bill to the Attorney General after making 
the amendments arising from the June stakeholder workshop. Due to critical changes in the ministry, the dairy 
reform process was delayed. 
 
1997 With financial assistance from DANIDA and consulting help from Prof. Mbogoh, the sub-committee of the Dairy 
Industry Act review task force was reconstituted to include the Ministry of Livestock, KDB, KCC, Planning 
Division and commercial farmers and charged with continuous review of policy. The sub-committee also reviewed 
the Act. Drafts of policy document were circulated to stakeholders for comment and after incorporating 
stakeholders’ comments, a new draft policy document was presented to a stakeholder workshop held at Karen 
KCB Institute in November and attended by SDP Project Manager, KDB, MALDM, ILRI, KARI, university 
academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
 
1998 The task force sub-committee revised the draft policy document to incorporate inputs from the November 1997 
workshop and circulated the revised draft for comments in February. The consultant finalised the document after 
receiving and incorporating comments. The committee presented the final draft of the policy to the Permanent 
Secretary in March and thereafter it was presented to the Ministry Policy Committee. 
 
1999 The ministry accepted the draft policy document in March; copies widely circulated to stakeholders. 
 
2000 With reconstitution of the committee, the ministry began work on the policy in March; new instructions were for 
the committee to harmonize the Bill and the policy document but changes in the ministry delayed the process. 
Harmonization of the two documents was completed in May and the harmonized document presented to the 
ministry, the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Natural Resources and the KDB Board of 
Directors in August/September. The Parliamentary Committee requested that stakeholders be given another chance 
to contribute to the documents, citing delay in harmonization and editing of documents.  
 
2001 A workshop on ‘Assessing and managing milk-borne health risks for the benefit of consumers in Kenya’ was held 
in February to present findings on levels of risk associated with different market channels and how to control the 
risks. Dairy Public Health Committee was formed as a result of the workshop and SDP invited to join.  
 
A stakeholders’ consultative workshop on the harmonized dairy Bill and Policy was held at Karen KCB Institute in 
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March and attended by the Parliamentary Committee. The Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development chaired 
the workshop and the Permanent Secretary moderated it. DFID funded the workshop through SDP. After the 
workshop, revised Bill and Policy document were resubmitted to the Parliamentary Committee. 
 
SDP and partners started participatory work with SSMVs to develop training approaches and appropriate 
containers for milk handling. SSMVs would later be asked to form groups and seek licensing.  
 
2002 Election year in which there was little activity other than follow-up with the Parliamentary Committee for 
comments (which were not forthcoming due to elections). 
 
2003 After the new government came into office, the Bill and Policy documents were resubmitted to the Parliamentary 
Committee in an attempt to revive the finalization process.  
 
SDP organized a workshop to develop a policy-influencing strategy and started to engage with CSOs as advocacy 
partners in preparation for a dairy policy forum. 
 
‘Milk wars’ in print and electronic media, pitting large-scale processors opposed to legalizing activities of SSMVs 
against NGOs and SDP allies in favour of legalization of SSMVs. Independent articles written by journalists in 
support of SSMVs used research evidence from SDP. SDP partners also met with Ministers for Labour and 
Livestock providing research evidence in support of legalization of SSMVs.  
 
2004 SDP and partners organized a dairy policy forum in May with government ministers, members of parliament and 
key industry stakeholders in attendance. SDP research findings were presented to support pro-poor dairy policy 
reform. Policy briefs were officially launched and a video ‘Unheard voices from Kenya’s dairy industry’ was 
shown.   
 
In September, subsidiary legislation/legal notices 101, 102 and 103 were gazetted, allowing KDB to develop 
procedures that would allow SSMVs to operate legally. 
Source: Adapted from discussion with HG Muriuki; Leksmono et al. (2006) 
 
Table 2.  Distribution of SSMVs interviewed in Nairobi and Nakuru 
Type of business Nairobi Nakuru 
% interviewed  % licensed  % interviewed % licensed  
Mobile trader (producer) 48 100 47 100 
Mobile trader (non-producer) 16 100 20 67 
Transporter-trader 16 100 13 100 
Milk bar 20 100 20 100 
Total 100  100  
Source: Authors’ survey data (2007) 
Table 3.  Proportion of SSMVs reporting different types of licences 
Type of licence  % of Nairobi SSMVs  % of Nakuru SSMVs  % of all SSMVs 
Milk bar licence 45 53 49 
Mini-dairy licence  3 27 15 
Milk movement permit  67 20 44 
Medical/public health 
certificate 
19 3 11 
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Business permit 6 3 5 
Source: Authors’ survey data (2007) 
Table 4.  Average daily prices of milk and market margins before and after the policy change 
Type of business Nairobi price (KES/litre) Nakuru price (KES/litre) 
 Purchase Sale Margin Purchase Sale Margin 
Before policy change   
Mobile trader (producer) 14.27 19.53 5.26 13.00 20.77 7.77 
Mobile trader (non-producer) 15.40 23.80 8.40 14.17 19.00 4.83 
Transporter trader 14.43 20.57 6.14 16.50 20.00 3.50 
Milk bar 18.43 24.43 6.00 17.60 23.60 6.00 
Average for all SSMVs  15.35 21.48 6.13 14.42 20.85 6.42 
After policy change  
Mobile trader (producer) 15.20 20.53 5.33 14.86 22.14 7.28 
Mobile trader (non-producer) 16.60 23.60 7.00 14.50 19.50 5.00 
Transporter trader 16.14 21.00 4.86 17.50 21.50 4.00 
Milk bar 20.67 25.33 4.66 19.40 24.60 5.20 
Average for all SSMVs 16.60 21.93 5.33 15.81 21.96 6.15 
 
Reduction in margin attributed 
to policy change, for Nairobi 
and Nakuru 
 
  0.80   0.27 
Mann–Whitney test statistics 
(before vs. after)  
 
Z=1.36; p=0.087 Z=0.85; p=0.1977 
Average margin over all locations and trader types, before policy change  6.26 
Average margin over all locations and trader types, after policy change  5.72 
Overall average reduction in margin attributed to policy change  0.54 
Source: Authors’ survey data (2007) 
Table 5.  Variables for estimating economy-wide welfare changes attributed to the new dairy 
policy 
Variable description Symbol  Value  Source of information  
Raw milk production Q 4.02 billion litres SDP Policy Brief 10 (2005) 
 
Retail price  Pr KES 21.57/litre  Study survey (averaged over 
all locations and SSMV sales) 
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Farm price Pf KES 15.58/litre  Study survey (averaged over 
all locations and SSMV 
purchases) 
 
Non-market input cost per unit of 
output 
Pn KES 7.06/litre  Estimated using data from 
Salasya et al. (2006) and 
updated SDP milk production 
data 
 
Elasticity of milk demand at retail εr -0.97 Salasya et al. (2006) 
 
Elasticity of milk supply at farm ef 0.35 Salasya et al. (2006) 
 
Elasticity of marketing services supply em 2 Freebairn et al. (1982) 
 
Cost reduction due to changes in 
transaction costs  
W 
 
 
KES 0.54/litre 
 
 
Study survey, decrease in 
retail farm price margin 
(comparing before and after 
policy change)  
 
 
Table 6.  Variables used in estimating welfare changes attributed to the new dairy policy in 
the Nairobi area 
Variable description  Symbol  Value  Source of information  
 
Raw milk production  Q 493 million litres  Assuming supply clears the 
market, estimated from SDP 
data showing annual per capita 
milk consumption at 145 litres 
and Nairobi population at 3.4 
million in 2005 
 
Retail price  Pr KES 21.70/litre  Study survey (averaged over 
all locations and SSMV sales) 
 
Farm price Pf KES 15.97/litre  Study survey (averaged over 
all locations and SSMV 
purchases) 
 
Non-market input cost per unit of 
output 
Pn  KES 6.90/litre  Estimated using data from 
Salasya et al. (2006) and 
updated SDP milk production 
data 
 
Elasticity of milk demand at retail εr -0.97 Salasya et al. (2006) 
 
Elasticity of milk supply at farm ef 0.35 Salasya et al. (2006) 
 
Elasticity of marketing services supply  em 2 Freebairn et al. (1982) 
 
Cost reduction due to changes in 
transaction costs  
W 
 
 
KES 0.80/litre 
 
 
Study survey, decrease in 
retail farm price margin 
(comparing before and after 
policy change)  
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Table 7.  Distribution of gains from the policy change 
Change in benefits (million KES) Scenarios 
 Cost reductions only occur at the level of the SSMV   
Economy-wide 
 
Nairobi area  
 
Benefits to consumers  520.84 95.01 
Benefits to producers  1042.62 193.78 
Benefits to SSMVs 280.60 48.67 
Benefits to input suppliers  330.82 58.63 
Total benefits 2174.87 396.09 
Annual expenditure on SDP (1997–2004) 40.63 40.63 
Annual costs of training and licensing (2005–2039) 864.00 864.00* 
*Note that these are countrywide costs and are only being applied to the Nairobi scenario in 
totality for the sake of expediency. 
 
Table 8.  Cost-benefit analysis of the new policy for different cost and interest rate scenarios 
 Years Scenarios 
Economy-wide  Nairobi area 
Annual cost  1997-2004 40.63 40.63 
2005-2039 864.00 864.00 
Annual benefit 1997-2004 0 0 
2005-2039 2174.87 396.09 
NPV (at 1.99%) 
NPV (at 5%) 
NPV (at 15%) 
IRR 
28,288.92 
14,978.64 
3,051.03 
55% 
-10,509.71 
-5,720.72 
-1,373.56 
n/a 
Costs and benefits in million KES 
 
Table 9.  Differences in NPV with and without SDP, for economy-wide scenarios 
Time delay  Interest rate  
(%) 
NPV 
(without SDP) 
Difference in NPV 
(with SDP – without SDP) million KES 
Economy-wide scenario 
10 years late  1.99 18,329.35 9959.57 
5.00 8060.72 6917.92 
15.00 787.42 2263.61 
IRR 108%   
20 years late  1.99 9901.65 18,387.27 
5.00 3644.45 11,334.19 
15.00 176.07 2874.96 
IRR 62% 
10 years late: legalization occurs in 2014 
20 years late: legalization occurs in 2025 
